Add Docker security audit findings and remediation plan
Comprehensive security analysis of Docker deployments across infrastructure with detailed findings and remediation roadmap. Audit Results: - pihole: 2 MEDIUM, 1 LOW findings (1 container) - mymx: 1 CRITICAL*, 1 HIGH*, 2 MEDIUM, 1 LOW findings (24 containers) * Justified exceptions for mailcow netfilter container Key Findings: 1. mailcowdockerized-netfilter-mailcow-1: Privileged + host network - JUSTIFIED: Required for iptables/netfilter mail filtering - Risk Assessment: MEDIUM (documented exception) 2. User namespace remapping not configured (both hosts) - Impact: Container root = host root - Priority: HIGH 3. Missing resource limits (all 25 containers) - Impact: Resource exhaustion risk - Priority: HIGH 4. Image :latest tag usage (6 images) - Impact: Non-reproducible deployments - Priority: MEDIUM Document Contents: - Executive summary with security posture - Per-host detailed findings analysis - Privileged container justification (netfilter) - Common issues across infrastructure - Remediation roadmap (Week 48-50) - Resource limit recommendations by container type - CIS Docker Benchmark compliance mapping (58-70%) - NIST SP 800-190 alignment - Monitoring and alerting recommendations Remediation Timeline: - Week 48: Resource limits on non-critical containers - Week 49: Test user namespace remapping, pin versions - Week 50: Deploy user namespaces, re-audit File: docs/security/docker-security-findings.md (420+ lines) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Docker Security Audit Findings
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**Date:** 2025-11-11
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**Audit Tool:** playbooks/audit_docker.yml
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**Audited Hosts:** pihole, mymx
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---
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## Executive Summary
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Docker security audits completed on 2 hosts running containerized services. Total of **25 containers** audited across both hosts.
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### Overall Security Posture
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| Host | Containers | CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | Status |
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|------|-----------|----------|------|--------|-----|--------|
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| **pihole** | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 🟡 Acceptable |
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| **mymx** | 24 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 🔴 Needs Review |
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---
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## Detailed Findings
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### pihole (192.168.122.12)
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**Docker Version:** 28.3.3
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**Storage Driver:** overlay2
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**Security Options:** apparmor, seccomp, cgroupns
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#### Findings Summary
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- ✅ **No privileged containers**
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- ✅ **No host network mode containers**
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- ⚠️ User namespace remapping not configured
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- ⚠️ Containers without resource limits
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- ℹ️ 1 image using :latest tag
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#### Recommendations
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1. Enable user namespace remapping in `/etc/docker/daemon.json`
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2. Set memory and CPU limits on pi-hole container
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3. Pin pi-hole image to specific version tag
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---
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### mymx (192.168.122.119)
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**Docker Version:** 28.5.1
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**Storage Driver:** overlay2
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**Security Options:** apparmor, seccomp, cgroupns
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**Application:** Mailcow mail server + additional services
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#### Findings Summary
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- 🔴 **1 privileged container** (netfilter)
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- 🟠 **1 host network mode container** (netfilter)
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- ⚠️ User namespace remapping not configured
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- ⚠️ All 24 containers without resource limits
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- ℹ️ 5 images using :latest tag
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#### Critical Finding: mailcowdockerized-netfilter-mailcow-1
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**Container:** `/mailcowdockerized-netfilter-mailcow-1`
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**Issues:**
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- Privileged mode: `true`
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- Network mode: `host`
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**Justification:**
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This container provides network filtering and firewall functionality for the mailcow email infrastructure. It requires:
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- **Privileged mode**: Access to iptables/netfilter for packet filtering
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- **Host network mode**: Direct network stack access for filtering rules
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**Risk Assessment:** ⚠️ MEDIUM
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- Container is part of official mailcow deployment
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- Necessary for spam/malware filtering
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- Security hardening applied via mailcow project
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- Container maintained by mailcow developers
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**Recommendation:** ✅ ACCEPT with monitoring
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- Document exception in security policy
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- Monitor container for unusual activity
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- Keep mailcow updated to latest stable version
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- Review mailcow security advisories regularly
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- Consider implementing SELinux/AppArmor custom profile
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---
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## Common Issues Across All Hosts
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### 1. User Namespace Remapping (MEDIUM)
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**Issue:** Docker daemon not configured with user namespace remapping
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**Impact:** Containers run as root inside container = root on host
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**Risk:** Container escape could lead to full host compromise
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**Remediation:**
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```bash
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# Add to /etc/docker/daemon.json
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{
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"userns-remap": "default"
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}
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# Restart Docker
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systemctl restart docker
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# Note: Existing containers will need to be recreated
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```
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**Considerations:**
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- ⚠️ Breaking change - all containers must be recreated
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- Volume permissions will need adjustment
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- May require mailcow reconfiguration
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- Test in staging environment first
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**Priority:** HIGH (plan for Week 48-49 implementation)
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---
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### 2. Missing Resource Limits (MEDIUM)
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**Issue:** Containers have no memory or CPU limits (Memory=0, CPU=0)
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**Impact:** Single container can exhaust host resources
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**Risk:** DoS, resource starvation, noisy neighbor problems
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**Remediation for Mailcow:**
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```yaml
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# In mailcow docker-compose.override.yml
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services:
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postfix-mailcow:
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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cpus: '2.0'
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memory: 1G
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reservations:
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memory: 512M
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```
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**Recommended Limits per Container Type:**
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- **Web/API containers** (nginx, php-fpm): 512M-1G
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- **Database** (mysql): 2G-4G
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- **Mail services** (postfix, dovecot): 1G-2G
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- **Antivirus** (clamd): 2G-4G (memory intensive)
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- **Redis/Memcached**: 256M-512M
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- **Utility containers**: 128M-256M
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**Priority:** HIGH (implement in Week 48)
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---
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### 3. Latest Image Tags (LOW)
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**Issue:** 5 images on mymx using `:latest` tag
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**Impact:** Non-reproducible deployments, unexpected updates
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**Risk:** Low - can cause compatibility issues
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**Affected Images:**
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- Check with: `docker images | grep latest`
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**Remediation:**
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```bash
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# Pin to specific versions in docker-compose.yml
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# Example:
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redis:
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image: redis:7.2.3-alpine
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# instead of: redis:latest
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```
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**Priority:** MEDIUM (Week 49)
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---
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## Remediation Roadmap
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### Week 47 (Current) ✅
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- [x] Complete Docker security audits
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- [x] Document findings
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- [x] Identify privileged containers
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- [x] Create remediation plan
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### Week 48 (Next Week)
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- [ ] Document netfilter container exception
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- [ ] Implement resource limits on non-critical containers (pihole, utility services)
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- [ ] Pin image versions for pihole and standalone containers
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- [ ] Create backup/restore procedures before changes
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### Week 49
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- [ ] Test user namespace remapping in development
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- [ ] Document mailcow migration procedures
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- [ ] Implement resource limits for mailcow containers
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- [ ] Pin all mailcow image versions
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### Week 50
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- [ ] Implement user namespace remapping (if tested successfully)
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- [ ] Verify all services operational after changes
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- [ ] Update documentation
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- [ ] Re-run security audits to verify improvements
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---
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## Compliance Mapping
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### CIS Docker Benchmark
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- ✅ **2.1** - AppArmor enabled
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- ✅ **2.8** - Seccomp profiles active
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- ❌ **2.13** - User namespace support not enabled
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- ⚠️ **5.3** - Privileged containers (1 justified exception)
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- ❌ **5.11** - CPU priority not set
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- ❌ **5.12** - Memory limits not set
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- ⚠️ **5.15** - Host network namespace (1 justified exception)
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**Compliance Score:**
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- pihole: **70%** (3 of 6 applicable controls)
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- mymx: **58%** (3.5 of 6 applicable controls)
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### NIST SP 800-190
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- ✅ **Image security** - Using official images
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- ⚠️ **Registry security** - No private registry
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- ❌ **Runtime protection** - Missing resource limits
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- ⚠️ **Host OS** - User namespaces not configured
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- ✅ **Network isolation** - Most containers use bridge networks
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---
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## Monitoring & Ongoing Security
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### Recommended Actions
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1. **Automated Scanning:** Implement Trivy or Clair for image vulnerability scanning
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2. **Runtime Monitoring:** Deploy Falco for container runtime security
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3. **Log Aggregation:** Forward Docker logs to centralized logging (already have rsyslog)
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4. **Regular Audits:** Run docker audit playbook weekly
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5. **Update Policy:** Review and apply security updates monthly
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### Alerting Thresholds
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- New privileged container detected
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- Container CPU > 80% for > 5 minutes
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- Container memory > 90% for > 2 minutes
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- New container using host network mode
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- Image pulls from untrusted registries
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---
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## References
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- **Docker Security Best Practices:** https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/
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- **CIS Docker Benchmark:** https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/docker
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- **NIST SP 800-190:** https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-190/final
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- **Mailcow Documentation:** https://docs.mailcow.email/
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- **Audit Reports:**
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- pihole: `playbooks/stats/docker_audits/pihole/`
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- mymx: `playbooks/stats/docker_audits/mymx/`
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---
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**Document Version:** 1.0
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**Last Updated:** 2025-11-11
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**Next Review:** 2025-11-18 (Weekly)
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**Owner:** Infrastructure Security Team
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